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THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF LAW
STUDENTS IN PRISON LEGAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS*
JOHN W. OLIVER**
I.
This conference is the first conference that has directed its principal
focus on the woefully neglected problems related to adequate legal
representation of prisoners. I have been asked to discuss both the uses
and the limitations of law students in legal assistance programs for
prisoners. This is a relatively narrow segment of where and how law
students may be used in the entire field of corrections and my remarks
should be so considered.
Some latter-day Cassandra will undoubtedly look back with
amazement at the uneven pace that we will have followed in the almost
inevitable establishment of some adequate publicly supported system
under which prisoners will be provided with the effective assistance of
counsel. It is quite beside the point to ponder why our fundamental
commitment to equal justice under law has not been considered
applicable to prisoners confined in correctional institutions; or even to
convicted persons who are only in constructive custody, on probation,
parole, or conditional release.
Meaningful discussion of our problem, however, must commence
* Addrcss delivered to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency's Conference on the
Role of Law' Students in the Correctional Process, September 5, 1969, at the University of New
Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
** Judge, United States District Court, Western District of Missouri.
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with acceptance of the candid admission made in the report of the
National Defender Project to the National Defender Conference held
in Washington last May that the area of postconviction problems has
"only recently" been viewed as a proper area of concern even for
organized legal aid and defender systems.' Certainly few others have
registered any concern at all. The recent expression of Chief Justice
Burger at the American Bar Association meeting in Dallas may mark
the beginning of new consciousness on the part of the organized bar.'
Appropriate recognition must, however, be given to other factors in
order that persons who may now become concerned in this particular
facet of the administration of criminal justice understand from the
outset that it is no race for the shortwinded to enter.
II.
It was twenty long years ago that the Supreme Court of the United
States articulated the principle of Young v. Ragan3 that every state
must afford state prisoners some "clearly defined method by which
they may raise claims of denial of federal rights." When Gideon v.
Wainwright and Douglas v. California' were handed down on March
18, 1963, even the most obtuse could understand that a great many
lawyers were going to be needed to provide counsel for the trial and
direct appeal of every future criminal case tried in every state and
federal court in the land.
But nobody thought much, if anything, about whether counsel were
going to be needed to represent all persons then in prison who had been
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal at
the time they were convicted and sentenced.
Indeed, the far greater impact of the trilogy of landmark habeas
corpus cases handed down the same day, Townsend v. Sain, Fay v.
Noia, 7 and Sanders v. United States,' (decided a few weeks later) went
1. NATIONAL DEFENDER PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 23-29 (1969).
2. See Burger, Court Administrators- Where Would We Find Them?, 53 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y
108 (1969).
3. 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
6. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
7. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8. 373 U.S. I (1963).
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virtually unnoticed. That habeas corpus trilogy, however, guaranteed
all state prisoners the right to a plenary evidentiary hearing on any and
all claims of denial of any federally protected right in the course of the
state criminal proceeding which led to their convictions. Those cases
established the principle that if the state courts refused to provide or
refused to follow adequate state postconviction procedures designed to
vindicate a denial of a federal claim that the United States district
courts, under appropriate considerations of exhaustion, were open to
the state prisoner without the procedural prerequisite of an application
for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
One would have thought that the various states would have tooled
up immediately to provide adequate state postconviction procedures in
order that the state courts, rather than the federal, would exercise
jurisdiction to discharge their primary responsibility over the
administration of their own state criminal laws.In 1965, however, Mr.
Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion in Case v. Nebraska,' two
years after the habeas trilogy had been decided, directed attention to
the fact that between the time Young v. Ragan was decided in 1949
and the time Case v. Nebraska was decided in 1965, only 13 of the
states had provided any adequate postconviction procedures at all.
State prisoners, of course, had read the 1963 Supreme Court's
opinions. They believed that the Supreme Court meant what it said.
The rush of state prisoners to the federal courts was on. In 1963, the
year in which the habeas corpus trilogy was decided, state prisoners
filed a total of 2,146 applications for habeas corpus and other relief in
all the United States district courts in the entire federal system.10 That
figure has continued an upward spiral every year since. In 1968, 10,889
state prisoner cases were filed. 1 Better than one out of every seven civil
actions filed in a federal district court today is filed by a state
prisoner. 2 But that is only a fraction of the story.
III.
Since Case v. Nebraska was decided in 1965, agitation over proposed
limitations on the exercise of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
decreased substantially as more rational light was thrown on the
9. 381 U.S. 336 0965) (concurring opinion).
10. Oliver. Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge- Revisited, 45 F.R.D. 199,
201 1968).
11. Q. id. at 200.
12. See id. at 199.
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necessity for more effective postconviction procedures in the States.
The history of the efforts made by my own state of Missouri reflects
that when a particular state approaches the discharge of its
responsibility seriously it can indeed establish and operate an effective
postconviction procedure. 3
An essential part of such a system, however, as the Supreme Court
of Missouri appropriately concluded in 1967,11 includes the mandatory
appointment of counsel to represent the indigent prisoner in his
postconviction proceeding in both the state trial and appellate courts.
All this means, of course, that in addition to postconviction counsel
required for the some 11,000 postconviction cases filed by state
prisoners in the federal courts, still additional thousands of counsel
must be appointed in the state court postconviction proceedings
throughout the country as an increasing number of States make
appropriate provision for their own postconviction proceedings.
I do not think it is necessary to cover in any detail the sharp increase
in federal tort claim prisoner actions and in federal civil rights cases
filed in the federal courts against the officials of state and federal
correctional institutions. Such discussion would simply underline the
number of lawyers needed to represent indigent prisoners.
IV.
But there are factors much more important than numbers to be
considered. In regard to the quality, as distinguished from the quantity
of legal assistance needed, I suggested to the National Defenders
Conference last May that:
Federal experience with its Section 2255 procedure establishes that any
adequate postconviction proceeding requires a more specialized legal
talent than that involved in the defense and direct appeal of a newly filed
criminal case. The questions of law presented on postconviction
proceedings, both state and federal, are frequently new and novel.
Factual investigation is difficult not only because court records are
sometimes lost or missing but because witnesses are dead or unavailable.
It is unrealistic to assume that constitutional standards relating to the
effective assistance of counsel can be met by a lawyer, to say nothing of
a law student, who is virtually untrained and totally inexperienced in the
13. See id.; Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge, 39 F.R.D. 281
(1965).
14. ANN. Mo. RULES § 27.26 (Supp. 1968).
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trial, direct appeal and subsequent postconviction proceedings incident
to a criminal case. One does not for a moment assume that an
experienced and competent general practitioner is, or could in a
relatively short period of time, become qualified to try a patent,
admiralty, or complicated antitrust case. And those cases only involve
money. Such an assumption cannot properly be made in regard to the
trial of any stage of a criminal case where someone's liberty is involved."t
The willingness to entertain the notion that prisoners do not need
effective legal assistance, or at best, they need only what minimal
assistance a law student might render, is undoubtedly associated with
the notion that all, or at least the vast and commanding majority of
all prisoners' claims are frivolous and filed only to harass the courts.
One of the most important projects that the law schools, using law
student manpower, could undertake is research that would collect the
hard factual data concerning the effectiveness of postconviction
litigation.
Such a project should not be undertaken on the theory that the
factual data is easy to collect. The difficulties arise out of the fact that
no one has thought it important to keep proper, if indeed any, records
of the cases. In those jurisdictions, however, in which both the federal
district court and the state trial and appellate courts all comply both
with the letter and the spirit of the Supreme Court's 1963 habeas
corpus trilogy, the data can be collected from the original court records
in the state and federal courts.
In Missouri, for example, there is no longer much talk about the
frivolous nature of all state prisoner postconviction proceedings. As I
have noted elsewhere in detail," the Supreme Court of Missouri, by its
1967 amendment of its postconviction Rule 27.26, insisted that the
Missouri state trial courts appoint counsel and conduct the required
postconviction evidentiary hearings in accordance with the
Constitution. Last year I was able to report the results of the first
group of State postconviction proceedings in which evidentiary
hearings were ever conducted by the circuit court of Jackson County,
Missouri, in which Kansas City is located.17
Data was then available on 26 cases filed between September 1, 1967,
Is Addrcs by Judge John \. Oh.er, National Defender Conference, Plenary Session 4. 16
Ma% 1 69, at lo, 22 (on file in \\ashington Unixersity Law Library).
16. Oliver, P)it onittiot Ipplications iewed by a Federal Judge- Revisited, 45 F.R.D. 199,
211-19 (1968).
17 1d1 at 21R
Vol. 1969: 381 ]
Washington University Open Scholarship
386 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 381
the effective date of Missouri's amended Rule 27.26, to July 1, 1968.
In the 17 cases which had been decided on the merits during that short
period of time, relief was granted in eight." I suggested to the Ninth
Circuit Judicial Conference in San Francisco last year that:
I have yet to find a judge, state or federal, who is not surprised to
learn that almost half of all postconviction motions properly processed
by evidentiary hearings in one metropolitan state trial court during less
than a year's time resulted in the granting of some form of relief to the
petitioner. I have found that judges, both state or federal, who have
actually conducted a number of postconviction evidentiary hearings are
not as surprised as judges who have not had that experience. The
assumption that only rarely will a case of merit be uncovered would
seem to be placed in doubt by the first sampling reported by one
Missouri trial court which is conscientiously making application of the
principles of the trilogy. 9
Additional doubt about the number of cases of merit to be uncovered
by appropriate postconviction proceedings was presented by the records
made in the same state trial court in postconviction cases processed
between July 1, 1968, through July 31, 1969.20 Thirty-six cases were
processed on the merits during that period; considerably more cases
than in the first period. Evidentiary hearings were held in 33 of those
36 cases; three cases were submitted on stipulated facts. Prisoner's
counsel, of course, were appointed in all the cases. Relief was granted
in 13 of the 36 cases.
The larger sample now available from one metropolitan state trial
court shows that in less than the two-year period involved, some form
of postconviction relief was granted in 21 out of the 53 cases processed
between September 1, 1967, and July 31, 1969.1 One need not add that
during that same period of time at least three of the state prisoners who
were unsuccessful in their state court postconvictions were eventually
granted federal habeas corpus.22 The sample would indicate that the
ratio of prisoner success in one metropolitan state court is greater in
postconviction proceedings than it is on direct appeal. No one would
18. Id.
19. Id. at 217.
20. Letter from former Kansas City, Missouri Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Joel Pelofsky
to Judge John W. Oliver, 7 August 1969.
21. Id.; Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge Revisited, 45 F.R.D.
199, 216 (1968).
22. This figure only represents cases filed in the author's division.
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seriously suggest today that there is no necessity for counsel on direct
appeal. Indeed, the rationale of why counsel is constitutionally required
on direct appeal is but another facet of the general postconviction
problem which has been generally ignored.
V.
Assistance of counsel cases over the past 37 years have for the most
part generally stemmed from the Supreme Court decisions of Powell
v. Alabamd3 and Johnson v. Zerbst2  Particular attention has been
given Mr. Justice Sutherland's recognition in Powell that a defendant
in a criminal prosecution "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. '25 The steady flow of sixth
amendment decisions by the Supreme Court since those two cases were
decided in the 1930's shows that, with one exception, the Supreme
Court has never shown any inclination to depart from the fundamental
proposition that the sixth amendment means what it says and that it
must be appropriately recognized in the administration of criminal
justice in all state and federal courts .2 The exception, of course, was
the Supreme Court's divided opinion in Betts v. Brady,27 which was
expressly overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright.28
On the same day that Gideon was decided, the Court made clear in
Douglas v. California"' that an indigent defendant was entitled to
counsel on direct appeal if all defendants in all criminal cases are
granted a right of at least one direct appellate review by the laws of a
particular state. I know of no state where this is not true.
It is of paramount importance to recognize, however, that Douglas
v. California was not based on the sixth amendment. Douglas v.
California based its decision on the equal protection and due process
23. 287 U.S 45 (1932).
24. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25. Id. at 463.
26. See, e.g, Orozo v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Chandler
v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Hawk v. Olson, 326
U.S. 271 01945; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Glasser v.
United State". 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
27. 316 U S.455 (1943).
28. 372 U S. 335, 339 (1963).
29. 372 U S. 353 (1963).
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clauses of the fourteenth amendment as those clauses had been earlier
applied in the landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois."° Douglas v.
California does not so much as even mention the sixth amendment;
that case was based on the fundamental premise that "where the merits
of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided
without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between the rich and poor. '31 That principle was established
back in 1956 by Griffin v. Illinois.3 1
Griffin v. Illinois and its ever increasing progeny, including but
certainly not limited to Douglas v. California, struggle with the
fundamental problem of whether "Equal Justice Under Law" is more
than a slogan chipped in marble above the entrance to the Supreme
Court building in Washington. Mr. Justice Frankfurter significantly
stated in his concurring opinion in Griffin that should the Court
"sanction . . .a money hurdle erected by a state, it would justify a
latter-day Anatole France to add one more item to his ironic comment
on the 'majestic equality' of the law. 'The law, in its majestic equality,
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets and to steal bread!' "33
The question of whether prisoners are constitutionally entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel, in my judgment, will not turn on
whether the sixth amendment rationale of Gideon v. Wainwright will
be extended beyond the right to have counsel at later stages of the
criminal proceeding, such as the revocation of probation, for example,
to which the right of counsel under the sixth amendment was indeed
extended in Mempa v. RhayA' The question, as I see it, will be
determined by deciding whether proper application of due process and
equal protection principles articulated in Griffin v. Illinois and its
progeny, and in cases such as Baxstrom v. Herold,3" Pate v.
Robinson,36 Specht v. Patterson,7 and most recently, in Johnson v.
A very,3 is going to require the legal profession in the United States to
make as fundamental a reappraisal of the needs of counsel for the
30. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
31. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
32. 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (concurring opinion).
33. Id. at 23 (concurring opinion).
34. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
35. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
37. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
38. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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convicted as it was required to make when it decided that counsel for
the prosecution should be publicly, rather than privately, supported.
39
VI.
The Supreme Court came very close to the appointment of counsel
in postcon viction proceedings question when it decided Long v. District
Court of 1owa.'0 The Iowa trial court had refused to appoint counsel
for a state prisoner in the state habeas corpus proceeding and it also
refused to furnish the indigent prisoner with a transcript of the habeas
corpus proceeding for purpose of appeal. Certiorari was granted in
regard to the latter question only. On the merits, the Iowa Supreme
Court was reversed under "the fundamental principle of Griffin v.
Illinois" as that principle had been applied in the earlier free transcript
cases of Smith v. Bennett," and Lane v. Brown.
42
Lane v. Brown, of course, was decided on that same March 18, 1963,
day that Gideon, Douglas. and the habeas corpus trilogy were decided
and, as the Court pointed out in Long, Lane v. Brown, had expressly
stated in 1963 that the principles enunciated in that case "were not to
be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extend alike
to state postconviction proceedings."'"
The rationale of Griffin v. Illinois and Long v. District Court of
Iowa was further extended this year to California's outmoded habeas
corpus proceedings in Gardner v. California." The Supreme Court held
in that case that "so long as this system of repeated hearings exists [in
California] and so long as transcripts [of the initial state habeas
hearing] are available for preparation of appellate hearings in habeas
corpus cases, they may not be furnished those who can afford them and
denied those who are paupers."' 5
39. 42 Am JUR Prosectting 4ttornevs § 2-8 (1942), notes that "the office of prosecuting
attorney is of comparatively recent origin" and that "'at common law, criminal prosecutions were
gVncrally carried on by individuals interested in the punishment of the accused, and not by the
public The private prosecutor employed his own counsel, had the indictment found and the case
laid before the grand jury, and took charge of the trial before the petit jury." Full time
prosecutors were unknown to the federal system until comparatively recent times; many state
jurisdictions do riot have full time prosecutors today.
40. 385 U S 192 (1966).
41. 365 U S. 708 (1961).
42. 372 U.S.477 (1963).
43. 385 U S. 192, 194 (1966).
44. 393 U S 367 (1969).
45. Id at 370.
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The Supreme Court has not yet decided the question of counsel
presented but not reached in Long v. District Court of Iowa. Other
courts have dealt with very similar problems. Chief Judge Murrah's
recent opinion in Earnest v. United States," for example, is much more
than a straw in the wind. Indeed, that case must, in my judgment, be
considered-as significant as Johnson v. Avery in regard to its impact
on the problem of counsel for the convicted. The question presented
was whether a federal mandatory release parolee was entitled to counsel
at his parole revocation hearing. Such a claim, based on the sixth
amendment, had been made and denied many times before Earnest's
case was decided. Earnest, however, perhaps because he had met a
bright law student while out of prison, based his claim on the idea that
because the board of parole procedures permitted persons who could
afford it to be represented by counsel that he, as an indigent, was
denied equal protection when the board of parole refused to provide
him with free counsel.
Chief Judge Murrah stated that "at issue here is the question
whether an agency of the federal government can administratively
afford counsel at revocation hearings to those financially able to retain
one while refusing appointed counsel to those financially unable."47 In
sustaining Earnest's contention, the court of appeals for the Tenth
Circuit stated:
To pose the question is to answer it, for Griffin and its progeny have
made it clear beyond doubt that where liberty is at stake a State may
not grant to one even a non-constitutional, statutory right such as here
involved and deny it to another because of poverty."
The court conceded that neither the parole board nor the district
court had any statutory authority to appoint counsel. It nevertheless
held that "So long as the Board allows retained counsel at revocation
hearings it must provide such for those financially unable to hire
o n e . ,49
The obvious implications of that decisioh are most far reaching. The
laws of many States expressly provide that a convicted person may be
represented by counsel of his own choosing in all sorts of
postconviction proceedings, including but not limited to parole
46. 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 683.
49. Id. at 684.
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revocations. The custom and practice of still other states have long
permitted employed counsel to appear in those postconviction
proceedings. It would seem certain that the basis upon which prisoners
will insist upon their right to effective assistance of counsel will, in the
future, be shifted from reliance on the sixth amendment to reliance on
the fourteenth amendment.
VII.
The likelihood that the rationale of Griffin v. Illinois and cases such
as Earnest v. United States will be expanded rather than contracted
would suggest that temptation to substitute law student prison projects
for experienced counsel prisoner assistance should be resisted.
But the fact that there are obvious limitations on the exclusive use
of law students in prisoner assistance projects does not mean for one
minute that law student participation in those projects should be
discouraged. There are particular areas that can be covered as well, if
not better, by students than by any other presently available source.
And there are by-products of student participation in prison projects
which may well prove to be more valuable in the long run than the
benefits received by the convict population.
The first obvious contribution that law students can make is to
provide experienced counsel with thorough and complete legal research
in a rapidly changing area of law. Johnson v. Avery makes clear that
if a State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates it must
provide some satisfactory alternative that will adequately meet the
needs of the prisoner.50 That case stated the obvious when it said that
"while the demand for legal counsel is heavy, the supply is light" and
that "legal aid, public defenders, and assigned counsel has been spread
too thinly to service prisons adequately."
51
An energetic and dedicated group of law students, under appropriate
guidance of a law professor or experienced counsel, can do the excellent
job of legal research required in order that experienced counsel may
spread his time more effectively among more inmates. The judges of
the federal court for the Western District of Missouri have had the
benefit of such law student work, as the reports of our cases show by
our expression of gratitude to the University of Missouri Schools of
Law at both Columbia and Kansas City.
50. 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
51. Id. at 493.
Vol. 1969: 38 11
Washington University Open Scholarship
392 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 381
Law students, however, in my judgment, should not limit their
research to purely legal questions. I have a case pending now which
presents the question of whether it is cruel and unusual punishment,
within the meaning of the eighth amendment, to keep a prisoner
waiting capital punishment on death row under the circumstances of
the physical facilities presently provided in the Missouri penitentiary.
The data on whether or how the various states hold their prisoners
under similar circumstances has never been gathered. The questions of
what prison regulations exist, how they are applied, and the reasons for
their promulgation present similar questions that call for like research.
I have already mentioned the research project to determine the
effectiveness of postconiction procedures.
Such questions, and many more like them, as Eugene Barkin
suggests in his excellent papers in the Nebraska Law Review and in the
Prison Journal,5 2 need the calm and objective examination that can be
afforded only by a competent research team. I know of no reason why
law students, perhaps working -with students of different disciplines,
could not and should not do that sort of work.
VIII.
The greatest long-term benefit, however, that is likely to flow from
the participation of law students in prison legal assistance projects may
be the number of law students who will learn enough about the
administration of criminal justice and about correctional institutions to
want to help make some badly needed and widely recognized changes.
It will be, I believe, from the group of law students who participate in
prison assistance projects who will later insist that the attention of the
public, the bar associations and the legislative bodies of the appropriate
governmental units make a more systematic attack on the problems of
crime and punishment that are now, for the most part, kept out of sight
and therefore out of mind.
In summation, the Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility is to be highly commended for its sponsorship of this
conference on the role of the law student in the correctional process.
It has wisely selected the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
52. Barkin, Emergence of Correctional Law and the A wareness of the Rights of the Con victed,
45 NEB. L. REv. 669 (1966); Barkin, Impact of Changing Law Upon Prison Policy, 49 PRISON
J. 3 (1969).
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to lend its knowledge and experience to the project. Best of all, we have
law students in actual attendance who will make us all speak the truth
as we see it so that, tomorrow, we will be able to do a better job than
we are doing today.
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